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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over final orders in formal adjudicative proceedings 
originating with the Public Service Commission. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(i). 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the Commission erred when it twice determined, based on long-
established policy, that in the absence of a governing tariff provision a real estate developer must 
pay for the water plant infrastructure reasonably necessary to serve its development. 
Standard of review: The Commission's interpretation of a tariff is accorded 
"considerable deference," and is reviewed "for mere reasonableness or rationality" insofar as it 
does not violate "general law." McCune & McCune v. Mountain Bell Telephone, 758 P.2d 914, 
918 (Utah 1988). Ordinarily, an agency's interpretation of statute is reviewed under a correction 
of error standard. Morton Intl, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 1991). When 
the agency is granted statutory discretion, either express or implied, then its interpretation of that 
statute is reviewed with "intermediate deference." Zissi v. State Tax Comm V., 842 P.2d 848, 852 
and n.2 (Utah 1992). See also Luckau v. Board of Review, 840 P.2d 811 (Utah App. 1992), cert, 
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
This issue also involves certain factual findings. Those findings are upheld when 
"supported by substantial evidence," which is "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence 
that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." WWC Holding Co. v. 
Public Service Commission, 44 P.3d 714, 718 (Utah 2002). 
v 
2. Whether the Commission erred when it declined to exempt petitioner from its 
established policj of reqi liring real estate developers to pay the water plant infrastructure costs 
reasonably necessary to serve new developments. 
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the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse ,uc discretion delegated to the agei icy by stati ite; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency 
by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
(Reproduced in the Appendix) 
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I I i j \i i CODE i \:N N §5 4 3 -1 
DETERMINATIVE REGULATIONS 
UTAH ADMIN. RULE R746-330-6 
Ratebase Treatment of Developer-owned Water or Sewer Company Assets -
Presumption of Recovery. 
I here is a rebuttable p r e s u m pt 1 0 n that the value of original utility plant and assets has 
been recovered in the sale of lots in a development to be served by a developer-owned water or 
sewer utility. 
UTAH ADMIN. RULE R309-510-8(3) 
Fire Suppression Storage. 
Fire suppression storage shall be required if the water system is intended to provide fire 
fighting water as evidenced by fire hydrants connected to the piping. The design engineer shall 
consult with the local fire suppression authority regarding needed fire flows in the area under 
consideration. This information shall be provided to the Division. Where no local fire 
suppression authority exists, needed fire suppression storage shall be assumed to be 120,000 
gallons (1000 gpm for 2 hours). 
o 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This action concerns the meaning and application of Wilkinson's 
tariff and whether it applies when a developer wishes to add a proposed subdivision to an 
existing system, and more particularly how the costs of the necessary water plant infrastructure 
are allocated. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: Bradshaw filed a complaint with the 
Public Service Commission (the "Commission") on May 5, 2000. (R. 2). Following a formal 
hearing on October 3, 2000, the administrative law judge (A. Robert Thurman) observed the 
Commission's "longstanding policy . . . requiring that real estate developers pay all costs of 
privately-owned water systems . . . and recover their costs . . . in the price of lots." The 
Commission determined that Bradshaw had "failed to prove violations of [Wilkinson's] tariffs, 
or of Commission rules, or other applicable law," (R. 29 at 4) and dismissed his complaint. That 
Report and Order was approved by the Commission on January 4, 2002. (Appendix 1). 
The Commission granted Bradshaw's request for rehearing and reconsideration. (R. 76). 
Following a second formal hearing on January 8, 2002, the Commission entered its Order on 
Reconsideration, affirming in all respects the first order. (Appendix 2 at 5, 8). The Commission 
concluded "that there is no need to alter the previous findings or discussion," (R. 216 at 8) and 
ruled, again, and consistent with "past practice," that Bradshaw is responsible for his 
proportionate share of the "water plant costs that are reasonably attributable to provide water 
service to his proposed subdivision." (R. 216 at 10). This appeal followed. 
l 
Statement of Facts: Wilkinson Water Company ("Wilkinson Water") has existed for 
thirty years. (R. 227, at 70). It serves five subdivisions and several independent lots, (R. 227, at 
195-199), totaling approximately 194 lots. Id. at 199, 200. Wilkinson serves 11 one-acre lots, 19 
five-acre lots and 1 four-acre lot, for a total of 31 lots that irrigate at least one or more acres. 
Wilkinson also serves 162 half-acre lots. (R. 227 at 200-01, R. 264, 265; R. 167 at 2). 
Wilkinson has two wells (source) and three tanks (storage). Id. at 201. Of the total 
storage capacity of the tanks—400,000 gallons—Wilkinson Water owns 254,000 gallons. The 
rest is owned by the Wilkinson Family. Id. at 202. Wilkinson Water uses that family-owned 
portion of the stored water to meet peak demands on the system. Id. at 206. 
During peak demand (and lately due to dry conditions), the well pumps operate around 
the clock. Id. at 208-09. In July of 2001, for example, the pump operated for all but fifteen 
hours. Id. at 209. Wilkinson's water system "is at or near capacity for both source and storage 
resources. In fact, as to storage, the company is in deficit. . . ." (R. 29 at 2, \ 4). 
Water companies such as Wilkinson do not have the ability to raise capital for 
infrastructure improvement or expansion. (R. 227, at 142). The largest water company has only 
500 customers. Id. Typically, they raise capital based on the personal guarantees of company 
management. Id. 
Like other utility companies, Wilkinson Water is governed by its tariff. (R.272). That 
tariff (Appendix 3) provides in relevant part as follows: 
2 
FACILITY EXTENSION POLICY 
1. Extensions. An extension is any continuation of, or branch from, the nearest 
available existing line of the Company, including any increase in capacity of an existing line to 
meet the customer's requirement. 
2. Costs. The total cost of extensions, including engineering, labor and material 
shall be paid by the applicants. Where more than one applicant is involved in an extension, the 
costs shall be prorated on the basis of the street frontage distances involved. Sufficient valves 
and fire hydrants shall be included with every installation. 
3. Construction Standards. Minimum standards of the Company shall be met, which 
standards shall also comply with the standards of the Utah State Bureau of the (sic) 
Environmental Health. Pipe sizes shall be designed by the Company, but the size shall never be 
smaller than 4". 
5. Water Storage and Supply. All costs for providing needed water supply and 
storage shall be paid by the Company. This cost shall include the installation and operation of 
pumps as required for proper pressure regulation of the system. 
(R. 280)(Appendix 3 at sheet 8). 
The Commission relies on a "longstanding policy" requiring real estate developers to pay 
the water plant infrastructure costs necessary to serve their developments, and then recover those 
costs in the price of their lots. (R. 29 at 3-4; R. 216 at 9). 
David Bradshaw ("Bradshaw") is a real estate developer (R. 96 at ^ 1) and purchased 
land in the Wilkinson service area as an investment. (R. 227 at 51). He also owns a home in the 
Wilkinson service area. (R. 56-57). He plans to develop the land into 21 home lots. (R. 96 at f 
1). He began the development process in 1993. He "put [his development] on hold," however, 
id. at 54, and returned several years and a number of Wilkinson water connections later, to 
pursue his investment. Id. He concedes that he may sell one, all or none of those lots. Id. at 51. 
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Following the five-year delay in pursuing his project, Bradshaw again approached 
Wilkinson seeking a commitment to supply water to his subdivision. Id. at 54. He was told then 
(1998) that he would need a tank, a well and other infrastructure to serve his project. Id. 
To estimate the amount of irrigable acreage and thus the demand on the Wilkinson 
system, Bradshaw measured certain lots. Id. at 56. He assumed his own lot was "representative 
of the types of houses that were going to come into the subdivision." Id. He is not, however, a 
typical water user. He uses an excessive amount of water at his own home—more than 50% 
more water than he is allotted. Id. at 56-57; Respondent's Exhibits D and E, R. 267 and 268). 
The tariffs of some utility companies include provisions for allocating infrastructure 
costs, or that otherwise allocates the risk of a proposed development, when new developments 
are added to the system. The Wilkinson tariff does not. (R. 216 at 7). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Bradshaw, a real estate developer, does not dispute, and never really addresses, the 
Commission's longstanding policy requiring real estate developers to pay the infrastructure costs 
for delivering water to new subdivisions. Neither does he suggest a reason for exempting him 
from that policy. 
Instead, he contends that his proposed 21-lot subdivision—now some ten years in the 
making—should be treated like an existing customer. He contends that his only cost is the 
standard hook-up fee that an individual homeowner pays when connecting to the system. That is 
the same fee that his future lot buyers will pay. In short, Bradshaw seeks a subsidy from the 
entity least capable of giving it. 
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Moreover, using flawed assumptions and incorrect data, Bradshaw attempts to show that 
Wilkinson actually has plenty of water to serve his 21 lots. Using his own lot as "typical," 
Bradshaw estimates water use by the average homeowner to challenge a finding that Wilkinson 
is at or near capacity in both source and storage. His own "prolific" water use belies the 
usefulness of these assumptions, however. 
Finally, after seeking and getting a second PSC hearing in order to demonstrate that he 
would pay his "fair share" of infrastructure costs, Bradshaw offered only the thinnest evidence of 
what that cost might be—an unsupported "estimate" from an unknown source. On appeal, he 
abandons even that position, claiming that his only obligation is the standard hook-up fee. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY BASED ITS DECISION ON 
LONG-ESTABLISHED POLICY THAT, ABSENT A GOVERNING 
TARIFF PROVISION, A REAL ESTATE DEVELOPER MUST PAY FOR 
THE WATER PLANT INFRASTRUCTURE NECESSARY TO SERVE ITS 
DEVELOPMENT. 
Utah's Public Service Commission ("Commission") exercises significant regulatory 
power, which includes duties to utility customers and the utilities. It must "supervise and 
regulate every public utility in this state, and . . . supervise all of the business of every such 
public utility in this state . . . ." It may "do all things . . . which are necessary and convenient in 
the exercise of such power and jurisdiction . . . . " UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-1. 
It is understatement to say that the Commission bears a difficult public duty. It owes 
utility consumers a duty to ensure "safe, efficient, and reliable utility service at a fair price based 
on the utility's cost of providing service." UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-l-l(2)(a). At the same time, it 
must afford the utilities "reasonable opportunities . . . to achieve earnings [that] . . . assure 
confidence in . . . the public utility; and yield returns" to investors. Id. at (2)(b)(i), (ii). See 
Justin Stewart, et al v. Public Service Comm n, 885 P.2d 759, 776 (Utah 1994) ("[T]he role of 
the Commission is to protect the interests of both the ratepayers and the shareholders and to 
accommodate both those interests to the overall public interest.") 
In order to meet these obligations, the Commission has broad discretion to "fix just and 
reasonable standards, classifications, regulations, practices, measurements or service to be 
furnished, imposed observed and followed by all . . . water corporations." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
54-4-18. See also North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co., 223 P.2d 577 (Utah 
1950). 
To these ends, the Commission has developed a number of policies and interpretive 
guidelines. Where new development is concerned, as it is in this case, the Commission assigns 
the risk of growth. It, first, leaves that risk with developers who encourage growth in an effort to 
profit from it. 
A. Bradshaw fails to consider the Commission's policy authority and grounds for 
deciding this case. 
Bradshaw appeals a case the Commission did not decide. He insists that the matter is 
resolved easily by merely reading one sentence from Wilkinson's tariff. (App. Brf. at 9, 11). 
That sentence states that "[a] 11 costs for providing needed water supply and storage shall be paid 
by [Wilkinson]. (R. 280, If 5). 
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The Commission, however, determined twice that the Wilkinson tariff does not address 
this dispute. That is, the extension policy applies "to a customer or prospective customer who 
requires an extension of the Company's facilities in order to begin his own consumption of water 
. . . . " (R. 216 at 5; R. 29 at 3). 
That does not describe Bradshaw. (R. 216 at 6). He is not an individual customer 
seeking a single water hookup. He asked for a "will serve" letter, which is an agreement by 
Wilkinson to serve each of his development's 21 lots. That letter constitutes a guarantee of 
service on which Bradshaw can rely as he markets those lots. The Commission was asked in this 
case to decide the question of how to assign the costs of the infrastructure for the entire 
subdivision. That is precisely what it did. 
Were the dispute about Wilkinson Water's current adequacy of service to Mr. Bradshaw, 
as a water service customer, or to other existing customers, we would place greater weight [on 
evidence concerning Wilkinson's source and storage capacity]. But the parties' dispute deals 
with who bears the costs, and the recovery of such costs, of preparing to meet anticipated future 
water service demands of consumers who may move into Mr. Bradshaw's proposed 
development. 
(R. 216 at 4). 
As a developer, Bradshaw would if he could sell all 21 lots tomorrow. His buyers would 
be entitled to water service. He cannot contend seriously that he is no different than an 
individual homeowner. He seeks, for his own profit, water service for 21 future homeowners, 
but demurs when informed that he must bear the costs—for wells, tanks, pipes—necessary to 
actually bring that water to those lots. 
7 
The Commission points out that "numerous utilities have tariff provisions that attempt to 
address the costs and risks, and allocation of the costs and risks, associated with a utility's . . . 
possible future service in a developer's proposed development. . . ." (R. 216 at 7). Wilkinson 
does not. Id. In other words, investment risk alone is a sufficient reason to treat a developer 
differently than a single homeowner when the governing tariff is silent. 
Accordingly, the Commission had to decide "what constitutes just and reasonable terms 
and conditions by which Wilkinson Water would be prepared to provide future service to 
customers who may locate in Mr. Bradshaw's proposed subdivision, when [Wilkinson] has no 
applicable tariff provisions." (R. 216 at 8). That is its statutory duty. Justin Stewart, 885 P.2d at 
776. 
The Commission's power in this regard is not without limits, of course. Hi-Country 
Estates Homeowners Assn. v. Bagley & Co., 901 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah 1995). But its 
discretion to determine rates and charges and to otherwise regulate public utilities remains broad. 
It regulates the relative rights and obligations between utilities and consumers. That is precisely 
what it was asked to do, and precisely what it did, in this case. 
That result brings the case squarely within the rather limited review parameters of section 
63-46b-16(4)(h). Bradshaw has not even addressed these standards, let alone demonstrated a 
violation of them. He contends that the Wilkinson tariff permits only the $1500 hookup charge, 
that Wilkinson Water must absorb all other costs, and that the Commission may not impose other 
charges not expressly permitted in the tariff. (App. Brf. at 9-12). 
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Bradshaw invokes section 54-4-18 of the Utah Code, suggesting that it mandates this 
result. But this code section is about much more than mere rate or price setting. It is instead a 
broad grant of policy-making authority, permitting the Commission first to "ascertain" and then 
to "fix" "standards, classifications, regulations, practices, measurements or service" for water 
delivery. UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-18. 
When acting in that capacity, the Commission's "interpretive guidelines" are not 
reachable by an attack based on substantial evidence. Mountain Fuel Supply v. Public Service 
Comm'/!., 861 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1993). In Mountain Fuel this Court noted that "the creation 
of interpretive guidelines is legitimate administrative function." Id. As such, the use of these 
guidelines cannot be challenged using the substantial evidence test. The guideline is "essentially 
a legal or policy determination." Id. 
In this case, where the Commission was required to address a certain class of prospective 
water customer—a real estate developer, the Commission relied on its standing presumption, 
which is simply an interpretive guideline used to allocate costs of infrastructure. The 
Commission looked to the rebuttable presumption "that the value of original utility plant and 
assets has been recovered in the sale of lots in a development to be served by a developer-owned 
water or sewer utility." UTAH ADMIN. RULE R746-330-6. (R. 216 AT 9). 
Although Bradshaw does not own the utility, the presumption remains because, first, the 
impact on Wilkinson is the same—twenty-one new connections that must be served. Moreover, 
any costs incurred for water infrastructure can (and according to the Commission are) passed on 
to lot buyers. 
Q 
Bradshaw offered no evidence or policy suggesting a reason "to depart from the 
Commission's past practice of placing the financial responsibility upon the real estate developer, 
with the concomitant developer opportunity to recover these costs in the sale of the developed 
property lots." (R. 216 at 9). 
The Commission considered exactly what it must when making such policy decisions; 
that is to say in this case, whether to depart from existing policy. 
In resolving this dispute, one must consider the direct costs of additional facilities and 
equipment and costs of their construction or installation; the costs incurred in the temporal 
disparities from the timing of preparation to provide utility service and the time transpiring in 
real estate development, from concept to actual customer occupancy on developed land; and the 
allocation of these costs and risks associated with their incurrence and recovery. 
Id 
Bradshaw offered no evidence on these issues. He admitted regarding one of them—"the 
time transpiring in real estate development"—that his efforts were less than diligent. He 
received what he believed to be a "will serve" letter in 1993. (R. 227, at 53). He then "put [his 
development] on hold." Id. at 54. Several years and a number of Wilkinson water connections 
later, he returned to pursue his investment. Id. 
This was a material fact considered by the Commission. 
The evidence introduced in this record shows that Mr. Bradshaw's efforts to actually 
develop the proposed subdivision have been intermittent. A number of years passed between the 
time Mr. Bradshaw first sought commitment from Wilkinson . . . to provide water services to the 
proposed development and when he subsequently approached the Company for a written 
commitment 
(R. 216, at 6). 
10 
Bradshaw offered only vague evidence on infrastructure costs—what the Commission 
meant by "the direct costs of additional facilities and equipment and costs of their construction or 
installation." (R. 227 at 48-50). Wilkinson offered detailed evidence on this issue. (R. 227, at 
212-219; Exhibit G(R. 281)). 
Bradshaw's failure in this regard is particularly glaring in light of his protest of the first 
commission ruling. He complained regarding that ruling that he "has always been willing to 
finance his fair share of the infrastructure costs . . . " (R. 37 at 9; 171 at 7), but that the first 
ruling failed to address that issue properly. Id.. He even stipulated that one of the disputed facts 
was "[t]he amount of infrastructure cost within the subdivision that [Bradshaw] will be required 
to pay to connect residences to the existing water system." (R. 96 at 3). 
Getting exactly what he asked for, the second ruling ordered him to pay his 
"proportionate share of water plant costs that are reasonably attributable to provide water service 
to his proposed subdivision." (R. 216 at 10). Now, he appeals that, but after offering only vague 
evidence as to what that "fair share" should be.1 Indeed, somewhere between the PSC hearing 
and this appeal, Bradshaw withdrew his oft-repeated offer to "pay his fair share." (R. 37 at 3-4, 
7 at n.5, and 10). He contends now that his cost is limited to the standard $1,500 hook-up fee. 
(App.Brf. at 1,9). 
1
 Bradshaw proposed an entirely unsupported cost "estimate" in his reply brief on rehearing. At 
the hearing, he testified concerning an alleged "engineering estimate," but failed to offer that 
estimate into evidence. (R. 171 at 7; R 227 at 50).). 
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Speculation is a third feature of real estate development. Bradshaw concedes that he 
might sell one, some or none of his twenty-one lots. (R. 227, at 51). The Commission twice 
observed the inherently speculative nature of Bradshaw's proposal. 
As indicated in the prior Order, the Commission has concluded that it is just and 
reasonable to have the real estate developer shoulder the financial burden and risks associated 
with his own development. Otherwise, a small water utility's customers must be exposed to the 
detritus of the developer's possible failure or lack of profitable success. 
(R .216a t9 ,c /R.29a t3) . 
B. Bradshaw has not been treated unfairly 
There is a difference in distinguishing between persons and in distinguishing between 
classes of service. Section 54-3-8 "prohibits all preferential rates between persons similarly 
situated." Mountain States Legal Found, v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 636 P.2d 1047, 1048 
(Utah 1981). "[A]s between persons, public utilities are prohibited from granting any preference 
or advantage or subjecting any person to "any prejudice or disadvantage." As between localities 
or classes of service, public utilities are prohibited from establishing or maintaining "any 
unreasonable difference." Id. at 1049 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the decision here would be subject to attack if it had sanctioned disparate 
treatment between similarly situated customers. But that decision was not made. Instead, the 
ruling is based on the treatment of and rates charged to an existing customer base in the face of 
land speculation by a developer seeking to add demand to an existing system already at capacity. 
(R. 216 at 9; R. 29 at 3). 
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When the tariff is silent, the Commission's policy is that the developer pays the 
infrastructure costs, which they can recover from the sale of lots. UTAH ADMIN. R. R746-330-6. 
Otherwise, as the Commission twice noted, the existing ratepayers are unwilling, unwitting 
participants in someone else's real estate venture. (R. 29 at 3). 
"[T]he underlying principle is that the existing rate payers cannot be asked to subsidize 
the expansion of a water system to serve future customers, regardless of what the scenario is or 
whether the developer is the same person [who owns the water company] or somebody else, the 
existing customer base cannot be asked to subsidize future development." 
(R. 227 at 136). 
Knowing that Wilkinson's storage capacity is a third less than what he proposes (R. 227 
at 202), and knowing that the source is fully taxed during peak demand (R. 227 at 209), 
Bradshaw argues that he is entitled to the last possible drop of Wilkinson water that might be 
available. He believes he is entitled to push Wilkinson's system to its physical limit—and then 
some. This Court established more than forty years ago that a developer is not entitled to 
threaten the integrity of a near-full system. 
In McMullin v. PSC, 320 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1958), the evidence showed that the water 
company was at or near capacity, based on actual use and based on prospective use within its 
service area. The Commission refused to order the water company to serve a proposed 
subdivision. 
This Court affirmed: 
[Based on that evidence] [t]here is thus justification for apprehension, as indicated by the 
Commission, that the inclusion of new territory in the Water Company's service area would 
imperil adequate and proper service within the locality now covered, and that prudent 
management of the water which the company has dedicated to culinary uses would dictate no 
n 
further extension lest the available supply be spread so thin that there would not be satisfactory 
service for anyone. 
M a t 1109. 
The Court added: 
The view here taken by the Commission is quite consistent with its purpose and 
responsibility of supervising the use of culinary water so that it will be neither wasted nor 
misused and that it will be so allocated that there will be satisfactory, adequate and continuous 
service to the portion of the public the Utility is undertaking to serve. 
Id. 
C. The Commission is not bound by the stipulated facts and issues when its task is 
to decide policy in the absence of governing tariff provisions. 
Bradshaw contends that the stipulated Issues and Fact List (R. 96) defined the universe of 
facts and confined the Commission's discretion. The stipulation hardly reaches that far. It 
merely identifies recommended standards promulgated by the Division of Drinking Water. 
Plainly, the Commission could have noticed those standards judicially. It then identifies 
disputed facts and issues. (R. 96). 
Nothing in the stipulation, or the request for it, even hints at a restraint on the 
Commission's authority and discretion under Title 54. The Commission's instructions 
concerning the stipulation describe its limited purpose: "The parties are to submit a list of agreed 
to or disputed issues and facts (Issues and Facts List), which they believe are relevant to 
resolution of this matter . . . ." (R. 86). The Commission never suggested it would be bound by 
what the parties saw as disputed, let alone what they deemed relevant. 
2
 Title 54 does not tie the Commission's policy determinations to water quality 
recommendations. The only instance where those recommendations appear to be controlling is 
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Bradshaw relies on First Denver Mortg. v. C.N. Zundel Assoc., 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 
1979), for the proposition that the Commission was bound by the stipulation. He could have 
cited Yeargin v. State Tax Comm 'n.9 20 P.3d 287, 293 (Utah 2001), which held that stipulations 
are binding in administrative proceedings. In any event, while ordinarily binding on the parties 
and the tribunal, "[s]uch is not the case . . . when points of law requiring judicial determination 
are involved." First of Denver, 600 P.2d at 527 (Utah 1979). 
The Commission addressed just such a "point of law." It considered the policy issues 
implicated in the question of whether and how water plant costs should be allocated. Stated 
another way, the issue is, at what cost is Wilkinson required to serve Bradshaw's proposed 
development? 
The Commission's task, therefore, was to decide the "just and reasonable" terms on 
which that water service would be made available. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 54-4-18, 54-3-1. 
That point of law and its inherent policy-driven analysis, and not any stipulated facts or issues, is 
what decided this case. 
At best, the Division of Drinking Water figures contained in the stipulation are "a 
recommended minimum." (R. 227 at 76, 89). The Commission took them just that way. (R. 
under R746-330-2, which relies on Drinking Water Board standards as the basis for assessing 
quality compliance under Title 54. That particular use of those standards does not require the 
Commission to adopt all water quality recommendations when establishing or enforcing policies 
concerning infrastructure cost allocations. In other words, the issue in this case is not water 
quality; it is cost allocation between a utility and a particular kind of proposed customer. 
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216 at 3)("As Mr. Birkes, a representative of the Division of Drinking Water, testified, the 
recommendations are just that, recommendations.") 
II. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S 
FINDING THAT BRADSHAW'S DEVELOPMENT WOULD OVERTAX 
WILKINSON'S WATER SYSTEM. 
Bradshaw uses the stipulation not only to tie the Commission to numbers that are 
recommendations only, but also to show error in the finding that Wilkinson has no excess source 
or storage capacity. (App. Brf. at 23-38). Relying on several tables and various proposed 
figures, Bradshaw expends considerable energy challenging a finding that only partly informed 
the decision against him. 
The Commission decided that evidence of whether Wilkinson's system is at or over 
source and storage capacity was relevant, but not dispositive. (R. 216 at 2-3). Bradshaw insists, 
however, that his calculations and "assumptions" (R. 227 at 56) demonstrate that the 
Commission erred as to virtually every issue before it, as though the entire case turns on that 
evidence, to say nothing of the weight Bradshaw gives his own "assumptions." 
A. Bradshaw's source and storage calculations are based on incorrect assumptions 
about water usage and actual Wilkinson capacity. 
One of Bradshaw's apparent "assumptions" was that fire flow required only 60,000 
gallons of storage. That error was corrected at trial. The actual requirement is 120,000 gallons, 
as the Commission found. (R. 227 at 80-81; R. 216 at 5). See UTAH ADMIN. RULE R309-510-
8(3), and R. 227 at 81-82. Correcting for that error, the Commission found that "even 
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[Bradshaw's] calculations show that [Wilkinson's] existing storage capacity is less than that 
suggested by the recommendations." (R. 216 at 5). 
Substantial evidence supports that finding. Probably the most critical evidence Bradshaw 
ignores—and which triggers his obligation to marshal—is that approximately one-third of 
Wilkinson's storage capacity is owned by the Wilkinson family. (R. 227 at 202, 60, 139, 149, 
140). The family purchased that capacity in an effort to reduce some of the water company's 
debt. (R.227atl39).3 
In other words, Wilkinson does not have enough storage of its own. It stores its water in 
a 400,000 gallon tank, but actually owns only 254,000 gallons of that storage. (R. 227 at 202). 
As to this evidence, Bradshaw tries to finesse with this additional incorrect "assumption": 
"Although Respondent's (sic) now have only 254,000 gallons of storage capacity, they have an 
arrangement with the Wilkinson [family] to provide up to 400,000 gallons for storage." (App. 
Brf. at 34). 
Here, Bradshaw takes considerable license. As just explained, the Wilkinson family 
owns 126,000 gallons of storage, which it could use for its own development, or which it could 
sell to Wilkinson Water. (R. 227 at 202, 60, 139, 149, 140). This "arrangement," as Bradshaw 
calls it, is merely a need dictating a courtesy. The family is under no obligation to allow the 
additional storage. It simply does, because without it Wilkinson cannot meet peak customer 
demand. (R. 227 at 206, 216 at 5). 
3
 There is nothing untoward about that transaction. The Division of Drinking Water was fully 
informed. (R. 227 at 139). 
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Therefore, as the Commission found, Wilkinson cannot meet its storage requirements 
without, in effect, borrowing from the family. (R. 29 at 2, ^ 4; R. 216 at 5).4 Wilkinson's 
storage deficit is obvious once Bradshaw's calculations are corrected for this significant error. 
Bradshaw's proposed remedy is that he is entitled, free of charge, to use storage capacity that 
neither he nor Wilkinson owns. 
Bradshaw's evidence on this issue was based on a number of other incorrect 
assumptions—the erroneous fire flow and storage figures are just two. He relied on his 
calculations of source and storage capacity. (R. 97 at 20). That evidence was based on 
assumptions concerning the size of the lots in the Wilkinson service area. 
Bradshaw mistakenly assumed that all of the lots Wilkinson serves are 0.46 acres in size. 
(R. 97 at 20, tables 1 and 2). The actual evidence is that Wilkinson serves 11 one-acre lots, 19 
five-acre lots and 1 four-acre lot, for a total of 31 lots that irrigate at least one or more acres. 
Wilkinson also services 162 half-acre lots. (R. 227 at 200-01, R. 264, 265; R. 167 at 2). Using 
Bradshaw's calculations from Table 2 (R. 97 at 20), to service the 31 one-acre lots (outdoor use), 
4
 Consistent with the finding in the first Report and Order (R. 29 at 2, ^ 4), the Commission 
found as follows: 
The testimony did establish that Wilkinson Water, in its usual operations, is using water 
storage capacity it does not own. Because the water storage capacity owned by the Wilkinson 
family is not physically segregated from the Company's storage capacity, the Company has 
routinely used the Wilkinson family's available capacity to meet the water service needs of the 
Company's customers. There was no evidence that the Company is paying the Wilkinson family 
any compensation for the Company's use of this additional storage capacity. 
(R. 216 at 5). 
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Wilkinson needs 78.12 gpm (2.8 gpm x .9 x 31 lots). Again using Bradshaw's own calculations 
(R. 97 at 20), Wilkinson needs 187.79 gpm for its 162 half-acre lots. 
Taken together, for outdoor use, Wilkinson needs a total of 384.07 gpm. for indoor and 
outdoor use. It has 380 gpm (R. 201), a deficit of 4 gpm. Indeed, Bradshaw's own "prolific 
water consumption" (R. 216 at ll)(he uses more than 50% more than he is entitled) and the 
actual use by others in the Wilkinson system make his "assumptions" and calculations quite 
academic. (See R. 267 and 268—showing actual customer water use). 
B. Bradshaw fails to consider the Wilkinson tariff as a whole, instead selecting 
only the provision that, if applied alone, will cost him the least. 
Tariffs function much like statutes. They constitute the "rates, rules and regulations" by 
which a utility must operate. UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-3-2, -3. As such, they can be interpreted 
like statutes. No one, least of all this Court, interprets statutes the way Bradshaw suggests. 
Statutes are read as a whole, not piecemeal. All of the provisions are analyzed together to 
determine meaning. Bus. Aviation ofS.D., Inc. v. Medivest, Inc., 882 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1994); 
Roberts v. Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah 1993). 
Relying on only a sliver of the Wilkinson tariff, Bradshaw argues that the "all costs" 
language of one portion of the tariff overrides the other portions and requires that Wilkinson pay 
for the infrastructure necessary for Bradshaw's 21 lot development. (App. Brf. at 11-12). 
Bradshaw does not consider the rest of the Facility Extension Policy. It provides as 
follows: 
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FACILITY EXTENSION POLICY 
1. Extensions. An extension is any continuation of, or branch from, the nearest 
available existing line of the Company, including any increase in capacity of an existing line to 
meet the customer's requirement. 
2. Costs. The total cost of extensions, including engineering, labor and material 
shall be paid by the applicants. Where more than one applicant is involved in an extension, the 
costs shall be prorated on the basis of the street frontage distances involved. Sufficient valves 
and fire hydrants shall be included with every installation. 
3. Construction Standards. Minimum standards of the Company shall be met, which 
standards shall also comply with the standards of the Utah State Bureau of the (sic) 
Environmental Health. Pipe sizes shall be designed by the Company, but the size shall never be 
smaller than 4". 
5. Water Storage and Supply. All costs for providing needed water supply and 
storage shall be paid by the Company. This cost shall include the installation and operation of 
pumps as required for proper pressure regulation of the system. 
(R. 280)(emphasis added). 
Avoiding this language altogether, Bradshaw argues that a strict construction of the tariff, 
applied only to paragraph 5, requires that Wilkinson fund his infrastructure. What eludes him is 
that the extension policy refers expressly to a "customer." Bradshaw (the developer, as opposed 
to a homeowner) is not a customer. The Commission twice determined that this policy does not 
apply to him at all. (R. 29 at 3; R. 216 at 5). 
He is a developer with a speculative project with no standing to demand that the existing 
Wilkinson ratepayers underwrite his investment. If the extension policy did apply, it identifies 
quite plainly who must pay the cost of an extension: "The total cost of extensions, including 
engineering, labor and material shall be paid by the applicants." (R. 280). 
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III. THE COMMISSION'S POLICY DETERMINATION THAT THE RISK OF 
DEVELOPMENT BELONGS TO THE DEVELOPER IS CONSISTENT WITH THE 
COMMISSION'S OBLIGATION TO ASSURE JUST AND REASONABLE CHARGES 
FOR UTILITY SERVICE. 
Public utility charges for "any product or commodity" or for "any service rendered, shall 
be just and reasonable." UTAH CODE ANN. §54-3-1. A utility must provide such services "as 
will promote the safety, health, comfort and convenience of its patrons, employees and the 
public." And in the end, the utility's service must be reasonable. Id. A utility may not prefer 
one person over another. UTAH CODE ANN. §54-3-8. 
Whether a charge is "just and reasonable," however, depends on a number of factors, 
some of which are suggested by the statute itself: 
The scope of definition "just and reasonable" may include, but shall not be limited to, the 
cost of providing service to each category of customer, economic impact of charges on each 
category of customer, and on the well-being of the state of Utah; methods of reducing wide 
periodic variations in demand of such products, commodities or services, and means of 
encouraging conservation of resources and energy. 
Id. at §54-3-1 (emphasis added).5 
Plainly, Wilkinson may, and the Commission must, consider the larger economic and 
physical impact of additional service to someone not yet a customer. Here, Wilkinson's system, 
Section 54-3-1 was amended, effective July 1, 2001. The first Commission hearing in this 
matter occurred on October 3, 2000. (R. 226). The second hearing was held on January 8, 2002. 
The 2000 amendment does not seem to have changed 54-3-1 much in substantive terms, at least 
in any way that affects this case. The pre-2000 amendment version is cited because it was in 
effect at the time the matter was filed with the Commission. See Marshall v.Industrial Comm'n., 
704 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985), quoting Department of Social Serv. v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 , 
1000 (Utah 1982)("general rule . . . that 'the substantive law to be applied throughout an action is 
the law in effect at the date the action was initiated.'") 
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"according to Utah Division of Drinking Water . . . standards, is at or near capacity for both 
source and storage resources. In fact, as to storage, the company is in deficit. . . ." (R. 29, at 2, 
1f4). 
These and other facts explain the Commission's two rulings that a real estate developer 
must pay the water plant and infrastructure costs reasonably necessary to serve it. Bradshaw did 
not offer a reason to exempt his development from a policy that applies to every other developer. 
Wilkinson's ratepayers should not, and the Commission ruled they will not, become involuntary 
investors in Bradshaw's decade-old project by footing the bill for his water service. 
The Commission's words bear repeating: "As indicated in the prior order, the 
Commission has concluded that it is just and reasonable to have the real estate developer 
shoulder the financial burden and risks associated with his own development. Otherwise, a small 
water utility's customers must be exposed to the detritus of the developer's possible failure 
(R. 216 at 9). 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission considered this matter twice. Both times it concluded that Bradshaw, 
and not Wilkinson's ratepayers, must pay for the hardware to serve his development. That result 
is consistent with longstanding PSC policy. Bradshaw does not demonstrate a reason to exempt 
him from it. The Commission ruled correctly, and this Court should affirm. 
October J 2 - , 2002. 
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Complaint of 
DAVID L. BRADSHAW, 
Complainant 
vs. 
WILKINSON WATER COMPANY, 
Respondent 
DOCKET NO. 00-019-01 
REPORT AND ORDER 
Issued: January 4, 2001 
SYNOPSIS 
Complainant having failed to show any violation of Respondent's published tariffs or of the 
applicable statutes and Commission rules, we dismiss. 
Appearances: 
David L. Bradshaw 
William White 
In Propria Persona 
For WILKINSON WATER COMPANY 
By the Commission: 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Pursuant to notice duly served, the above-captioned matter came on regularly for hearing 
the third day of October, 2000, before A. Robert Thurman, Administrative Law Judge, at the 
Commission Offices, Heber Wells Building, Salt lake City, Utah. Evidence was offered and 
received, and the Administrative Law Judge, having been fully advised in the premises, now 
enters the following Report, containing proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the 
Order based thereon. 
00029 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Complainant is a real estate developer wishing to market a subdivision located in the 
certificated area of Respondent, a certificated water corporation. Respondent is owned by 
the Wilkinson family, which also owns real estate in the area. The family has plans to 
develop its property, but nothing concrete or imminent. 
2. Respondent has indicated willingness to serve Complainant's subdivision, but only on 
condition that Complainant finance the costs of increased water source and storage 
capacity, which Respondent alleges is necessary to serve the project. 
3. Complainant contends that under Respondent's service extension tariff, he is not obliged 
to finance Respondent's infrastructure costs. 
4. At present, Respondent's system, according to Utah Division of Drinking Water (DDW) 
standards, is at or near capacity for both source and storage resources. In fact, as to 
storage, the company is in deficit, since part of the existing tank is owned by the 
Wilkinson family, which purchased an interest from the Respondent. The purchase was 
made at the urging of the Division of Public Utilities, Utah Department of Commerce 
(DPU) as a means of reducing rate base to the benefit of ratepayers. The purchase was 
made on the basis of an erroneous understanding of DDW requirements. The Wilkinson 
family has represented it is amenable to a resale of the storage capacity back to 
Respondent. 
5. For a previous subdivision in the area (Fox Hollow), the developer financed system 
improvements to the extent of approximately $100 per lot for enhanced source and $500 
per lot for increased storage - a total of approximately $100,000. Respondent estimates it 
would require a similar amount to upgrade the system to serve Complainant's 
subdivision. 
DOCKET NO. 00-019-01 
3 
6. Respondent is currently $130,000 in debt, mostly to the Wilkinson family, and has no 
borrowing capability from outside sources. 
7. Respondent has, on one occasion, extended service to a small (four or five lot) 
subdivision without requiring the developer to finance improvements to the system. 
However, apparently that project did not entail any system improvements by way of 
source or storage. 
DISCUSSION 
Complainant's claim to service without the necessity of financial participation in system 
improvements is based on Respondent's tariff PSC Utah No. 1, Sheet 8, which provides in 
paragraph 5 that "All costs for providing needed water supply and storage shall be paid by . . . 
.[Respondent]" 
However, the quoted paragraph must be read in conjunction with paragraph 1 which provides: 
An extension is any continuation of, or branch from, the nearest available existing 
line of the Company, including any increase in capacity of an existing line to the 
customer's requirement. (Emphasis added.) 
We believe the term "customer" in this context must mean a ratepayer of the utility, as 
opposed to a developer whose own customer will hook on to the system, but not the developer as 
such. Read together, then Paragraphs 1 and 5 obligate Respondent to extend service, with no 
charge for source or storage, to a party wishing to hook onto the system for the immediate 
delivery of water, not the developer of a speculative subdivision. 
A contrary construction would leave the utility at the mercy of a developer of a project of 
any size, with the concomitant potentiality of either bankrupting Respondent or imposing 
prohibitive rates on existing ratepayers to finance system improvements. This is clearly an 
unreasonable result. 
The Commission has a longstanding policy, extending back 20 years or more, of 
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requiring that real estate developers pay all costs of privately-owned water systems up front and 
recover their costs for such improvements in the price of lots. For rate making purposes, the costs 
of such improvements are allocated to a "Contribution in Aid of Construction" account which is 
not part of the Utility's rate base on which it is allowed to earn. 
In the vast majority of cases, the water system is owned by the developer which makes 
the implementation of the policy simple. The instant case presents a novel feature in that the 
developer is not the owner. However, in principle we see no reason why we should create an 
exception. The same hazards exist as to the interests of existing and future ratepayers as well as 
system integrity and viability. The developer has the same opportunity to set his lot prices so as 
to recover his costs. And the developer, if the project is viable at all, has better financing 
resources than the utility. In short, we do not believe existing ratepayers should be made 
unwilling participants in Complainant's speculation.1 
We believe it is in the public interest that Complainant defray the costs of system 
improvements necessary to procure the necessary governmental approvals for, and service to, his 
project. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Commission has party and subject-matter jurisdiction. Complainant has failed to 
prove violations of Respondents tariffs, or of Commission rules, or other applicable law. 
Accordingly, the Complaint should be dismissed. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
• the complaint of DAVID L. BRADSHAW against WILKINSON WATER 
COMPANY, be, and the same hereby is, dismissed. 
1Nor do we have jurisdiction to require the owners to increase their investment in the utility. 
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If DAVID L. BRADSHAW wishes to proceed further, DAVID L. BRADSHAW 
may file a written petition for review within 20 days of the date of this Order. 
Failure so to do will forfeit the right to appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 4th day of January, 2001. 
C?. &d-u*xtfls, Ct-7>n^ 
A. Robert Thurman 
Administrative Law Judge 
Approved and Confirmed this 4th day of January, 2001, as the Report and Order of the 
Public Service Commission of Utah. 
— - — x ^ XF~\ v y "f ^'-StephenF. Mecham, Chairman 
Constance B. White, Commissioner 
Cyj^^U,,^ 
Clark D. Jones, Commissioner a r t 
Attest: 
-*^\ JM^/*\ X 
Jiilie Orchard 
Commission Secretary 
I hereby certify that on Thursday, January 4, 2001,1 served a true copy of the hereto 
attached REPORT AND ORDER on the persons whose names are set forth below by mailing 
such copy of said date in a post office in Salt Lake City, Utah, properly enclosed in a sealed 
envelope with postage prepaid thereon, legibly addressed to the addresses shown: 
*See attached mailing Lists and "E" Mailing lists 
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LAKE CITY UT 84117-0635 
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LAND AND WATER FUND OF THE ROCKIES 
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I? LAKE CITY UT 84107 
DAVID L. BRADSHAW 
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of David L. Bradshaw 
vs. 
Wilkinson Water Developer's Request for 
Commission Intervention 
DOCKET NO. 00-019-01 
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION 
ISSUED: February 26, 2002 
By the Commission: 
The Commission originally adopted an Administrative Law Judge 
Recommended Order in this Docket on January 4, 2001. The Order dismissed Mr. David 
Bradshaw's complaint, determining that he had "failed to prove violations of [Wilkinson 
Water Company's] tariffs, or of Commission rules, or other applicable law." January 4, 
2001, Order, page 4. Thereafter, Mr. Bradshaw petitioned for reconsideration. The 
Commission granted reconsideration on March 14, 2001. After numerous, unsuccessful 
efforts by the parties to mutually resolve their dispute after the grant of reconsideration, 
the parties informed the Commission that they were unable to resolve the matter through 
mutual agreement and that the Commission should proceed with reconsideration. 
Discussion with counsel for the parties indicated that the parties had factual disputes on 
matters which they claimed were relevant to resolution of the dispute and continued to 
have disputes concerning the application of the factual record previously developed in 
this matter. After the parties' requested extensions, a second hearing was held January 8, 
2002. At that hearing, Mr. Bradshaw was represented by J. Craig Cook and Scott Crook, 
oo 
DOCKET NO. 00-019-01 
-2-
of the law firm of Nielsen & Senior, Wilkinson Water Company (Wilkinson Water or the 
Company) was represented by David Wright and William N. White, of the law firm of 
White & Mabey, and the Division of Public Utilities (DPU) was represented by Kent 
Walgren, Assistant Attorney General. 
At the January 8, 2002, hearing, the parties introduced evidence through 
the following witnesses: Mr. Bradshaw; William Birkes, a representative of the Utah 
Division of Drinking Water, Department of Environmental Quality; Mike Babcock, a real 
estate developer; Barry Golding, an employee of the DPU; and Wayne Wilkinson, 
manager of Wilkinson Water. The evidence introduced at the January 8, 2002, hearing 
did not vary much from the evidence introduced at the prior hearing held October 3, 
2000. Although the January 8, 2002, evidence replicates the prior evidence, it does 
provide greater detail or depth on the circumstances facing Mr. Bradshaw and Wilkinson 
Water. It also highlights the ultimate underlying dispute between the parties and clarifies 
that the Commission's prior order, although correct on the issue(s) that it addressed, did 
not resolve this dispute. The fundamental dispute between the parties concerns the just 
and reasonable terms, conditions and charges by which Wilkinson Water would serve in 
Mr. Bradshaw's proposed real estate development, including customers who 
subsequently move into the development. 
At the second evidentiary hearing, the parties presented evidence 
reflecting their respective views of how to calculate the demand for water utility services, 
from Wilkinson Water's existing customers and those that may locate in Mr. Bradshaw's 
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proposed development, relative to Division of Drinking Water recommendations for 
water source (gallons per minute production capability) and water storage amounts. The 
parties have conflicting views on how to determine the irrigable area of lots of existing 
customers and possible future customers of the Company. This calculation has bearing on 
determining the gallons per minute that the Division of Drinking Water's 
recommendations suggest the Company's wells should be able to produce. Mr. 
Bradshaw's calculation results in a lower number, which on an average basis, appears to 
be within the Company's wells' current capacity. Wilkinson Water's calculation 
produces a higher number, which would appear to exceed the current capacity. 
Although the Commission believes that consideration of well production 
capacity has relevance in this matter, it does not believe that the absolute numbers 
resulting from the competing calculations should be directly applied in the fashion 
advocated by the parties. Whether the Company's wells appear to have production 
capacity that falls short of or exceeds the gallons per minute recommendations of the 
Division of Drinking Water, is not singularly dispositive of determining the terms and 
conditions by which Wilkinson Water would prepare to serve possible, future customers 
in Mr. Bradshaw's proposed development. As Mr. Birkes, a representative of the 
Division of Drinking Water, testified, the recommendations are just that, 
recommendations. A water company's actual well production capability may vary from 
the numerical value suggested in an application of the recommendations to the company 
and still be an approved system. Mr. Birkes' testimony established that a system's 
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evaluation is made on a number of factors. A company could have well capacity below or 
above the recommended gallons per minute and still receive either an approved or 
unapproved classification. Similar to the obligation our utility law imposes for "adequate 
service," see, U.C.A. § 54-3-1, the Division of Drinking Water's evaluation attempts to 
make a determination of the overall adequacy of a system's service. Absolute compliance 
with a water production recommendation is not necessary. 
Such evidence has less direct relationship in resolving the actual dispute 
between the parties. Were the dispute about Wilkinson Water's current adequacy of 
service to Mr. Bradshaw, as a water service consumer, or to other existing customers, we 
would place greater weight on such evidence. But the parties' dispute deals with who 
bears the costs, and the recovery of such costs, of preparing to meet anticipated, future 
water service demands of consumers who may move into Mr. Bradshaw's proposed 
development. As will be discussed below, the Commission believes this evidence has 
some relevance to our consideration, but not in a 'straight by the numbers' application 
presented by the parties. 
The parties' varying irrigable acreage assumptions and calculations also 
have an impact on comparing Wilkinson Water's water storage capacity to the level 
suggested by the Division of Drinking Water's recommendations. Again, Mr. Bradshaw's 
calculation results in a value below Wilkinson Water's current storage capacity; 
compared to the Company's calculation, which exceeds current capacity. In this instance, 
however, in addition to their opposing views of what constitutes the irrigable acreage, 
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Mr. Bradshaw also includes a smaller value (60,000 gallons as opposed to 120,000 
gallons) for storage levels for fire flow needs. Mr. Birkes' testimony established that the 
higher value is correct. When Mr. Bradshaw's calculation is corrected for this error, even 
his calculations show that the Company's existing storage capacity is less than that 
suggested by the recommendations. The testimony did establish that Wilkinson Water, in 
its usual operations, is using water storage capacity it does not own. Because the water 
storage capacity owned by the Wilkinson family is not physically segregated from the 
Company's storage capacity, the Company has routinely used the Wilkinson family's 
available capacity to meet the water service needs of the Company's customers. There 
was no evidence that the Company is paying the Wilkinson family any compensation for 
the Company's use of this additional storage capacity. As in well production capability, 
we believe information on water storage capacities is relevant, but not in as direct a 
fashion as advocated by the parties. 
Mr. Bradshaw reargues his contention that Wilkinson Water's Facility 
Extension Policy, included in its tariffs, has application in resolving the dispute. As we 
originally held, we disagree. As the Commission construes those provisions, they are not 
applicable to Mr. Bradshaw's situation. The Commission continues to construe the 
Facility Extension Policy as applicable to a customer or prospective customer who 
requires an extension of the Company's facilities in order to begin his own consumption 
of water services offered by the Company. As such, the tariffs overall provisions make 
sense, relative to a utility's cash flows and investments. The Company may be required to 
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extend its facilities, but the customer is required to bear the costs of extending 
distribution facilities and any necessary upgrades. Although the Facility Extension 
Policy's provisions state that the Company bears the costs of providing water storage and 
supply in this situation, the Company also receives revenues from charging the customer 
the service connection charge set out in its tariff and receives ongoing monthly revenues 
from the customer's monthly fixed charge and water consumption charges included in the 
tariff. 
This is not Mr. Bradshaw's situation. Mr. Bradshaw would require 
Wilkinson Water to expand and upgrade facilities, not to meet Mr. Bradshaw's own 
water service consumption, but to be prepared to serve possible, future customers in his 
proposed development. But Mr. Bradshaw would make no additional contributions to the 
Company's costs beyond dedicating the distribution system which Mr. Bradshaw would 
ultimately install within the proposed development upon completion of the subdivison. 
The evidence introduced in this record shows that Mr. Bradshaw's efforts to actually 
develop the proposed subdivision have been intermittent. A number of years passed 
between the time Mr. Bradshaw first sought commitment from Wilkinson Water to 
provide water services to the proposed development and when he subsequently 
approached the Company for a written commitment from the Company. l 
1
 The written commitment is needed for Mr. Bradshaw to obtain preliminary approval for the proposed 
development from local government and zoning authorities. 
DOCKET NO. 00-019-01 
-7-
With Mr. Bradshaw's proposed multi-lot development, Wilkinson Water 
faces the prospect of incurring costs to be prepared to serve possible, future customers, in 
Mr. Bradshaw's multiple lot development. While the Company incurs such expansion 
costs in the near term, it would be left to the vagaries of the approval process for the 
subdivision, development of the real property, placement of the subdivision's 
infrastructure, individual lot marketing, sale, and development, and Mr. Bradshaw's 
diligence in performing these activities. Thereafter, the Company would have an 
opportunity to begin receiving revenues to help defray the costs incurred to be able to 
provide service to an ultimate customer who eventually receives water service in the 
proposed subdivision. While numerous utilities have tariff provisions that attempt to 
address the costs and risks, and allocation of the costs and risks, associated with a 
utility's for possible future service in a developer's proposed development, Wilkinson 
Water does not have such provisions in its tariff. It is precisely this lack of pre-existing 
tariff terms and conditions that precipitated the parties' dispute. The Commission's prior 
Order discusses relevant considerations the Commission has made in the past, when 
addressing the reasonableness of the terms and conditions a developer and utility2 face in 
this type of situation, but did not provide any resolution of the dispute in this particular 
case where Wilkinson Water has no applicable tariff provisions. In this regard, Wilkinson 
2
 The consideration is not limited to the impacts upon the developer and the utility. We must also consider 
the impact the terms and conditions may have on the existing and future customers of the utility. See, 
U.C.A.§54-3-l. Costs and risks not allocated to the developer or utility owners end up being shouldered by 
the utility's customers. 
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Water's existing water production and water storage capacities have some relevance. 
Where possible, future demand from individuals who may locate in Mr. Bradshaw's 
proposed subdivision make the Company's existing capacities appear to be inadequate, 
expansion may be reasonable. But the Company, and its existing customers, could be 
saddled with expanded plant, ready to provide service in Mr. Bradshaw's proposed 
development that may be slow to materialize, or never materialize, depending on Mr. 
Bradshaw's pace of activities and success. Mr. Bradshaw's request that the Company 
prepare to serve his multi-lot subdivision represents an increase of over ten percent in the 
Company's customer base and likely the same or greater increase in services demanded 
by this single project. The Commission believes that this scale is sufficiently significant 
for a small water utility and its existing customers to require the proposed subdivision's 
developer to participate in bearing the risks and costs of expanding a utility system to 
meet his project's needs. 
Having reviewed the January 4, 2000, Order on reconsideration, the 
Commission concludes that there is no need to alter the previous findings or discussion. 
The Commission recognizes, however, the need to address and provide guidance on the 
specific dispute between the parties, i.e., what constitutes just and reasonable terms and 
conditions by which Wilkinson Water would be prepared to provide future service to 
customers who may locate in Mr. Bradshaw's proposed subdivision, when the Company 
has no applicable tariff provisions. 
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The record does not develop a reason to depart from the Commission's 
past practice of placing the financial responsibility upon the real estate developer, with 
the concomitant developer opportunity to recover these costs in the sale of the developed 
property lots. In resolving this dispute, one must consider the direct costs of additional 
facilities and equipment and costs of their construction or installation; the costs incurred 
in the temporal disparities from the timing of preparation to provide utility service and 
the time transpiring in real estate development, from concept to actual customer 
occupancy on developed land; and the allocation of these costs and risks associated with 
their incurrence and recovery. As indicated in the prior Order, the Commission has 
concluded that it is just and reasonable to have the real estate developer shoulder the 
financial burden and risks associated with his own development. Otherwise, a small water 
utility's customers must be exposed to the detritus of the developer's possible failure or 
lack of profitable success. Nothing in the existing record supports a departure when 
dealing with Mr. Bradshaw's proposed development. 
This is not to say that the real estate developer must pay for any water 
plant facility conceived by the utility. The Commission places upon the developer the 
burden of his own development, but no more than what is reasonably attributable to 
providing service to his proposed development. The record developed in this case 
suggests that Wilkinson Water attempted to follow this approach in preparing to provide 
service to a real estate development undertaken by Mr. Babcock. Mr. Babcock was 
required to pay for the proportionate share of water plant that was installed in connection 
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with the Company's preparation to serve Mr. Babcock's proposed subdivision. The 
Commission concludes that it is reasonable to require Wilkinson Water and Mr. 
Bradshaw (and any other multi-lot real estate subdivision developer) to follow the same 
course, until Wilkinson Water has Commission approved tariff provisions which address 
this type of land development situation. 
Mr. Bradshaw will be required to pay for the proportionate share of water 
plant costs that are reasonably attributable to provide water service to his proposed 
subdivision. These costs include the physical water plant, which includes water source 
(new wells or upgrades for increased water production from existing wells), water storage 
tanks, water distribution facilities and equipment, and the costs incurred in planning for 
such plant and its construction and installation. We recognize that utility plant 
development is not necessarily sized, engineered or built to provide service solely to one 
development. Deployment of utility plant takes into consideration the current and future 
uses of existing customers, potential customers that might locate in the proposed 
subdivision and potential customers that may locate elsewhere in the utility's service 
territory. As long as the overall deployment of additional water plant is reasonable in 
relation to the Company's reasonable operations, Mr. Bradshaw should provide for the 
recovery of a proportionate amount of the costs. The proportion should be based upon the 
capability or capacity of the plant installed and the capability or capacity reasonably 
needed to provide service to Mr. Bradshaw's proposed development. Wilkinson Water 
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will bear the costs associated with water plant that is planned or put in place that exceeds 
the needs of Mr. Bradshaw's proposed development. 
The Commission hopes that the parties can reach agreement on what 
constitutes reasonable plant deployment, reasonable costs to deploy such plant and Mr. 
Bradshaw's reasonable proportion of such plant and costs. Because of the parties' past 
intractability in reaching a mutually acceptable resolution, that hope may prove futile. 
While it would be helpful to provide greater detail in this order, the record does not 
provide support for many detailed instructions. The parties begin with widely varying 
views on even the initial aspects of determining the water service demand for the 
proposed subdivision. From the record testimony, it appears reasonable to assume that the 
irrigable acreage of a lot is sixty to seventy percent of its total size. However, Mr. 
Bradshaw has significant control over the calculation of the irrigable acreage, based upon 
the restrictive covenants he may impose upon the lots he intends to develop. The record 
also reflects that calculations of water needs based upon Division of Drinking Water 
recommendations and assumed water consumption does not mirror actual use for 
individual consumers. Mr. Bradshaw's own prolific water consumption, as a current 
customer of Wilkinson Water, is notable in comparison to the consumption of other 
customers. 
Wilkinson Water complained that Mr. Bradshaw had not provided detailed 
engineering plans for the plant that is necessary to provide service to the proposed 
subdivision. It is not clear if these missing plans are for the distribution facilities (e.g., 
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pipes) to be located in the proposed subdivision, or if they are for other types of plant, 
located inside or outside of the subdivision, needed, in conjunction with existing 
Company plant, to be able to provide service to the proposed subdivision (e.g., storage 
tanks). In the first instance, it is reasonable to have Mr. Bradshaw provide plans for the 
distribution facilities to be placed in the proposed subdivision. If the later case, however, 
we would be surprised if Mr. Bradshaw has access to needed information on the location, 
design and capacity of the Company's existing plant, in order to prepare plans for the 
integration of existing and new plant that even he thought was reasonably needed to 
provide service to his proposed subdivision. The Commission believes it more likely that 
Wilkinson Water would study and prepare plans to integrate Mr. Bradshaw's proposed 
subdivision into the Company's water system. Wilkinson Water did introduce estimates 
of costs for plant that it could install, but did not present sufficient or credible evidence 
that the specified equipment and other items are reasonably necessary to prepare to 
provide service in Mr. Bradshaw's proposed subdivision and what Mr. Bradshaw's 
reasonable portion might be. 
Wherefore, based upon the record, our January 4, 2001, Order and the 
discussion herein, the Commission orders as follows: 
1. Should David Bradshaw desire to proceed with his proposed development 
and obtain Wilkinson Water Company's commitment to provide water 
utility service in the proposed subdivision, he shall be required to provide 
for a proportionate share of reasonable costs of reasonably necessary water 
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plant installed or required to provide utility service to the proposed 
subdivision. 
2. This order represents our final order on reconsideration. We recognize that 
the parties may have future disputes in implementing this order. We direct 
the Division of Public Utilities to act as a mediator to facilitate resolution 
of future disputes between the parties. 
3. To the extent that the parties are unable to reach mutually acceptable 
resolution of future issues, further proceedings may be conducted by the 
Commission. Parties will be required to submit an itemization of the 
aspects of an issue that continues to be disputed and pre-file evidence 
necessary to resolve the dispute. Scheduling of further proceedings will be 
set as needed. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 26th day of February, 2002. 
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Approved and Confirmed this 26th day of February, 2002, as the Report 
and Order of the Public Service Commission of Utah. 
Stephelrir. MechamrChairman v 
Constance B. White, Commissioner 
Richard M. Ckmpbell, Commissioner 
Attest: 
Julie P. Orchard 
Commission Secretary 
Gr#2822l 
I hereby certify that on day, Tuesday, February 26, 2002,1 served a true copy of 
the ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION hereto attached on the persons whose names are set 
forth below by mailing such copy on said date in a post office in Salt Lake City, Utah, properly 
enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage prepaid thereon, legibly addressed to the addresses 
shown: 
See attached Mailing Lists and "E" Mailing Lists 
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LAND AND WATER FUND 
2260 Baseline, Ste. 200 
Boulder, CO 80302-7740 
Wilkinson V\Kter &>rop\rH 
3<Ho Wes4- old thjhwoy RcbvC( 
Mog^ n, ur 8^050 
Tab 3 
,10 
J-!iU / 33 A.. 
1
 »Pf 
Wilkinson Water Company 
Morgan, Utah 
Original 
P. S. C, 
Sheet No. 
Utah No. 
SCHEDULE OF RATES 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
TARIFF NO. 
Issued on not 
the Public by 
Order in Case 
less than five days' notice to the Commission and 
authority of the Public Service Commission of Utah, 
No. 95-019-01 dated December 22, 1995. 
Issued December 22, 1995 Effective December 22, 1995 
00063 
W I L K I N S O N W A T E R C O M P A N Y 
Notice to Water Users, 
On December 22, 1995, the Public Service of Utah 
approved the Company's application for a rate increase 
and a change in the rate structure. Effective 
January 1, 1996, the new rates applicable to all water 
users in the Company's service area are as follows: 
First 6,000 gallons at $15.00 minimum charge; 
Over 6,000 gallons at $1.15 per 1,000 gallons, 
or part thereof. 
The new rate structure is designed to provide ample water 
for your reasonable needs, but also to encourage 
conservation 
by making water use which is well in excess of the State 
standards for household water consumption more expensive. 
The January 1, 1996 water bill for the month of December, 
1995, was figured on the old rates. 
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Wilkinson Water Company First Revised Sheet No. 3 
Morgan, Utah P. S. C. Utah No. 1 
WATER SERVICE RATE SCHEDULE 
Applicabi1ity 
Applicable in entire service area to water service for 
culinary and domestic purposes at one point of delivery 
for use at a single dwelling unit, and for commercial 
purposes at a single business connection. 
Rate 
The following rate is for the period of one month: 
Usage Charges 
First 5,000 gallons $20-00 Fixed Charge 
Over 6,000 gallons i.65 per 1,000 gallons 
Service Connection Charges 
3/4" service to property line, where 
service fronts property line, 
including meter and rna t er i a 1 s . 
One time charge for each service 
requiring new meter installation. $1,500.00 
Turn-on service whore meter is 
^ir^dy in place 5 50.00 
T u r n - o f f s e r v i c e • ? 5 0 . 0 0 
Issued: June 12, 1998 Effect ive: June 13, 1998 
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Wilkinson Water Company 
Morgan, Utah 
Original Sheet No. 4 
P. S. C. Utah No. 1 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
1. Connections. No unauthorized person shall tap any 
water main or distribution pipe of the Company or insert 
fixture or appliance, or alter or disturb any service pipe, 
meter, or any other attachment, being part of the waterworks 
system and attached thereto. No person shall install any 
water service pipe or connect or disconnect any such service 
pipe with or from the mains or distribution pipes of said 
waterworks system, nor with or from any other service pipe 
now or hereafter connected with said system, nor make any 
repairs, additions to, or alternations of any such service 
pipe, tap, stop cock, or any other fixture or attachments 
connected with any such service pipe, without first 
procuring a permit from the Company. 
2. Application for Permit. Before any service connection 
shall be made to any part of the waterworks system, or any 
work performed upon old or new connections, a permit shall 
be obtained from the Company. Such permit shall be issued 
upon written application on forms obtainable from the 
Company. Applicants for water service shall furnish and lay 
and install all the portion of the service not provided by 
the Company, at their own expense, subject, however, to the 
supervision and inspection of the Company. 
3. Metering of Service. All water delivered by the 
Company to its customers shall be metered through water 
meters. Meters may be checked, inspected, or adjusted at 
the discretion of the Company and shall not be opened or 
adjusted except by authorized representatives of the 
Company. Meter boxes shall not be opened for the purpose of 
turning on or off water except by authorized representative 
of the Company, unless special permission is given, or 
except in case of emergency. Unauthorized entry into the 
water box may result in loss of service. 
4. Meter Adjustments. If the meter fails to register at 
any time, the water delivered during such a period shall be 
estimated on the basis of previous consumption. In the 
event a meter is found to be recording less than 97 percent 
or more than 103 percent of accuracy, the Company may make 
such adjustments in the customer's previous bill as are just 
and fair under the circumstances. 
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Wilkinson Water Company 
Morgan, Utah 
Original Sheet No. 5 
P. S. C. Utah No. 1 
RULES AND REGULATIONS (Continued) 
5. Service Connections. Any party desiring to obtain a 
supply of water from the Company shall make application in 
writing. The service connection charges shown in this 
Tariff include a meter, meter box, a cover, and a valved 
service line to the property line. The meter and meter box 
will be located as directed by the Company. All materials 
furnished by the Company shall remain the property thereof. 
Excavation and installation shall be made by the Company 
from the main line connection in the road to three feet 
beyond the meter. 
6. Service Line. All service line materials and 
installation shall be provided by the applicant. 
Installation shall be inspected and approved by the Company 
before the service line trench is backfilled. A shutoff 
valve shall be provided by the applicant on each service 
line, in an accessible location,.-separate from the water 
meter box. 
7. Water Use Restrictions. The owner or occupant of any 
building or premises entitled to the use of water from the 
Company shall not supply water to any other building or 
premises, except upon written permission of the Company.. 
8. Service Turn-on and Turn-off. No unauthorized person 
shall turn the water from any main or distribution pipe into 
any service pipe. Service may be turned off by the Company 
when so requested by the applicant or when the applicant 
fails to abide by these regulations. Whenever the water is 
turned off from any premise, it shall not be turned on again 
until the applicable charge shown in the rate scheduled has 
been paid. 
9. Disruption Liability. The Company shall use reasonable 
diligence to provide continuous water service to its 
customers, and shall make a reasonable effort to furnish 
them with a clean, pure supply of water, free from injurious 
substance. The Company shall not be held liable for damages 
to any water user by reason of any stoppage or interruption 
of his water supply caused by scarcity of water, accidents 
to works or water main alterations, additional repair, acts 
of God, or other unavoidable causes. 
0006S 
Wilkinson Water Company 
Morgan, Utah 
Original Sheet No. 6 
P. S. C. Utah No. 1 
RULES AND REGULATIONS (Continued) 
10. Damage_.to.Fa.ciliti.es. Water meter may be installed 
upon any premises supplied with water, and any damage to 
said meter, or other facilities of the Company, resulting 
from the failure of the owner, agent, or tenant to properly 
protect same shall be assessed against such owner, agent, or 
tenant. Water consumers shall not tamper with or remove the 
meter, or interfere with the reading thereof. 
11. Reading of Meters. All meters will be read by the 
Company each month, excepting November, December, January, 
February and March. The monthly charges for the months when 
meters are read shall be based upon the meter readings, 
except as provided for in Paragraph 4 herein above. The 
monthly charge for the months the meters are not read will 
be a rate of $15.00 per month. 
12. Billing and Payments. Bills covering the charges shall 
be rendered monthly and shall be due fifteen (15) days after 
being rendered. If any customer neglects, fails, or refuses 
to pay water service bill or any other obligation due to the 
Company within thirty (30) days from the date of said bill, 
the Company's employees shall have the right to go upon" the 
premises and make such excavation or do such work as may be 
necessary to disconnect the water service. Before the 
service is renewed, the delinquent bill or bills shall be 
paid in full, or arrangements made for -payment that are 
satisfactory to the Company, and the established Tariff 
charge for re-connection shall be paid by the delinquent 
customer. Late fee in the amount of 1-1/2% per month of the 
unpaid balance may be assessed against past due accounts. 
13. Credit Deposit. The Company may, at its option and in 
lieu of established credit, require a deposit from the 
customer to assure payment of bills as they mature; such 
deposits shall be a minimum of 90 days estimated bill or 
$40.00. Deposits may be refunded when credit has been 
established. Deposits held over 12 months shall earn 
interest from the Company at the rate of 12% per annum. 
Interest will be credited to the account of the consumer 
„ w a t e r Company W i l k i n s o n V»ater 
Morgan, Utah 
Original Sheet No. 7 
p S. C Utah No. 1 
RULES AND REGULATIONS (Continued) 
hours for such 
for the governing 
system. 
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Wilkinson Water Company Original Sheet No. 8 
Morgan, Utah P- S. C. Utah No. 1 
FACILITY EXTENStQN,_PQLICY 
1. Extensions. An extension is any continuation of, or 
branch from, the nearest available existing line of the 
Company, including any increase in capacity of an existing 
line to meet the customer's requirement. 
2. Costs. The total cost of extensions, including 
engineering, labor and material shall be paid by the 
applicants. Where more than one applicant is involved in an 
extension, the costs shall be prorated on the basis of the 
street frontage distances involved. Sufficient valves and 
fire hydrants shall be included with every installation. 
3. Construction Standards. Minimum standards of the 
Company shall be met, which standards shall also comply with 
the standards of the Utah State Bureau of the Environmental 
Health. Pipe sizes shall be designed by the Company, but 
the size shall never be smaller than 4". 
4
- Ownership. Completed facilities shall be owned, 
operated, and maintained by the Company including and 
through the meters, as detailed in the Tariff Rules and 
Regulations. 
5. Water Storage and Supply. All costs for providing 
needed water supply and storage shall be paid by the 
Company. This cost shall include the installation and 
operation of pumps as required for proper pressure 
regulation of the system. 
6. • Temporary Service. The customer will pay the total 
cost for the installation and removal of any extensions for 
service to a venture of a temporary or speculative 
permanency. The Company will receive the estimated cost 
from the customer before beginning work on the extension. 
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Tab 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (2002) 
§54-4-1. General jurisdiction 
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate 
every public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the business of every such public 
utility in this state, and to do all things, whether herein specifically designated or in 
addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of such power and 
jurisdiction; provided, however, that the Department of Transportation shall have 
jurisdiction over those safety functions transferred to it by the Department of 
Transportation Act. 
HISTORY: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 4, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 4798; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 76-4-1; 
L. 1975(lstS.S.),ch.9, §15. 
Tab 5 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-18 (2002) 
§ 54-4-18. Electric, gas, and water service 
The commission shall have power, after a hearing, to ascertain and fix just and 
reasonable standards, classifications, regulations, practices, measurements or service to 
be furnished, imposed, observed and followed by all electrical, gas and water 
corporations; to ascertain and fix adequate and serviceable standards for the measurement 
of quantity, quality, pressure, initial voltage or other conditions pertaining to the supply 
of the product, commodity or service furnished or rendered by any such public utility; to 
prescribe reasonable regulations for the examination and testing of such products, 
commodity or service, and for the measurement thereof; to establish reasonable rules, 
regulations, specifications and standards to secure the accuracy of all meters and 
appliances for measurements; and to provide for the examination and testing of any and 
all appliances used for the measurement of any product, commodity or service of any 
such public utility. 
HISTORY: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 4, § 17; C.L. 1917, § 4814; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 76-4-
18. 
Tab 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1 (2002) 
§ 54-3-1. Charges must be just; service adequate; rules reasonable 
All charges made, demanded or received by any public utility, or by any two or more 
public utilities, for any product or commodity furnished or to be furnished, or for any 
service rendered or to be rendered, shall be just and reasonable. Every unjust or 
unreasonable charge made, demanded or received for such product or commodity or 
service is hereby prohibited and declared unlawful. Every public utility shall furnish, 
provide and maintain such service, instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as will 
promote the safety, health, comfort and convenience of its patrons, employees and the 
public, and as will be in all respects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable. All rules and 
regulations made by a public utility affecting or pertaining to its charges or service to the 
public shall be just and reasonable. The scope of definition "just and reasonable" may 
include, but shall not be limited to, the cost of providing service to each category of 
customer, economic impact of charges on each category of customer, and on the well-
being of the state of Utah; methods of reducing wide periodic variations in demand of 
such products, commodities or services, and means of encouraging conservation of 
resources and energy. 
HISTORY: L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 3, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 4783; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 76-3-1; 
L. 1977, ch. 206, § 1; 2000, ch. 352, § 10. 
